Afghan Awakening

One may recall that our original Afghan strategy was to provide air support and special forces assistance to the Northern Alliance and let the locals do the heavy lifting. It seemed like a good idea UNTIL Tora Bora.

I was always a bit surprised at the disparity between our troop levels there and the full-on invasion force that we assembled in Kuwait.

In the end unless we intend to annex ME regions, we will have no choice but to deal constructively with the inhabitants.

Joe:
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How much of the corruption in the current Karsai Government are political bribes and pay-offs to these same "locals"? The so-called "Warlords" who have held power over their people for hundreds if not thousands of years?
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Do you really believe that these "Warlords" will succumb to simply saying, "we want to set up a democratic government, that is fair and just for your people" will work like it worked in Iraq?
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Isn't the problem in Afghanistan really a whole bunch of little Sadam Hussein's controlling small parts of the country overall? How are you going to change a 1,000+ year reign of mini-dictators to accept democracy? We both know that if you do not get the people to rise up, and together defeat their dictators, then democracy never has a snowballs chance in hell of ever working.
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If I am a villager in a small Afghan valley. I have known for hundreds if not thousands of years my family has been held hostage by these Warlords, and sooner or later the "foreigners" will leave. Who do you think I will show my allegiance to?
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The choice is to either go in full force, kill all the "bad" people or get the hell out period. My vote is to get the hell out now before anymore American lives are lost.
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Since the Fort Hood incident I am confident that the Islamic Jihad will never end. It is time we begin looking at defending ourselves here at home, period. Concentrate on shutting down our borders once and for all. Restrict access into the US and make it almost impossible for anyone to get in or out without the highest level of scrutiny. That is how we protect ourselves and this country. Not fighting a losing battle in the remote valleys in Afghanistan.

If the U.S.--and, especially, the Kabul government--can establish credibility as a friendly force that will provide economic, humanitarian and some tactical support, without demanding payoffs in return
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Do you think the fact that it's been eight years and we haven't managed to do this is any sort of problem?
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And do you really think Karzai will establish a government that doesn't require payoffs?
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Really?

" .. Let's hope it works as well as it did in Iraq, .."

"works well"?
What! Did we find what we were after - Saddam's WMDs?
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" .. The U.S. is beginning to support tribal militia fighting the Taliban. .."

"Taliban"?
What! Are we through with those we were after - bin Laden's Al-Queda?

Joe : are you looking for bits of sunshine in a gloomy place. Increasing the number of troops or civilian helpers will do little to stabilise the country. Is Afghanistan a country, say like Poland? ( a country which has faced attempts at dismemberment over time). Afghanistan should be called Warlordistan. That would say it all.

"Afghanistan should be called Warlordistan. That would say it all."

Or "Pipelinestan", perhaps?

http://michaelfury.wordpress.com/2009/05/11/the-gas-must-flow/

This seems to be the only adequate and sensible course of action at the moment. Coalition forces are overwhelmed in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan, the Afghan police and military are feckless, disorganized, and unprepared, and the Afghan government is siphoning off billions in US aid. Afghanistan is, and has been, a decentralized country. Power and influence, and more importantly legitimacy, are all localized. By supporting local warlords committed to protecting their villages and lands their is hope that insurgency can be countered in more rural areas. With the Obama admin bogged down in endless discussions between Gates, McChrystal, and Eikenberry regarding troop levels something needs to be done in the interim. Even if a decision is made to send in more troops, how effective is that? Afghans will never succumb to foreign pressures or influences. They need local and legitimate leadership and encouragement to defend their homes. The warlords provide this, as they always have. Why not support them? We must be sure, though, to only support well entrenched militias and warlords with preexisting local legitimacy. If we begin arming our own ad-hoc militias we risk turning the local populace against the "American puppet" warlords and worse, possibly arming those whose intentions are less than sincere.

" .. The U.S. is beginning to support tribal militia .."

JK, why would we, foreigners, be supporting hitherto lawless "militia" in a far-away foreign land, a sovereign land - so we say, which has an internationally-recognized government?

OK, so it is part of the media duplicity (and you are a mere cog in the works ...)

[...] Joe Klein at Swampland at Time: Sunday morning brings a glimmer of good news from Afghanistan, courtesy of the amazing Dexter Filkins. The U.S. is beginning to support tribal militia fighting the Taliban. This is important because the weakest link in the military’s Afghan plan is the idea that we can train a 250,000 man Afghan army and 150,000 police officers. It’s important to train up some organized security forces, especially for the more urban areas. But Afghanistan is a land of a thousand remote valleys and those are best defended by their residents, as they always have been. If the U.S.–and, especially, the Kabul government–can establish credibility as a friendly force that will provide economic, humanitarian and some tactical support, without demanding payoffs in return, there is a very good chance that the local tribes will reject the Taliban. Ultimately, this is the only way the situation can be stabilized. Let’s hope it works as well as it did in Iraq, although you always have to add the caveat: this is a very different, and more difficult, country. [...]

Until the US can start examining what "winning" looks like to an Afghan rather than an American, the US is wasting its time.

Afghans need to be convinced that it is the Taleban and Al - qaeda who are the invaders, and the US are the defenders, much like 2001. Things went pear - shaped when Cheney finally understood the low - risk/high - reward benefits to shareholders of running a nation building strategy.

Republicans passionately oppose government intervention except when it is their government intervening in the lives of others, either domestically when Republicans are in power, or internationally at all times. If there is one thing a Republican cannot resist, it is telling someone else what to do.