More on McKiernan

the Al Qaeda-style religious extremists are compiling an unblemished record of being kicked out of the areas where they've taken control because their brand of Islam is so inhumane and irreligious
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Funny how that works.
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At the end of the day we have to recognize that sovereign nations are and should be responsible for their own defense. We certainly can't afford to plan for yet another permanent occupation. And as you point out, militant Islam can be its own worst enemy when it has the opportunity.

Really? How about the pledge from the Taliban to allow women to go to school (for starters)?

What will qualify as success in Afghanistan and how will it be sustained if we leave. There is the very real possibility that even if we manage to get the Taliban under control for a period of time, long enough for us to leave, that they will rise again. Then what?

This won't be easy to achieve, or enforce, especially not after the last eight years--on the other hand, the Al Qaeda-style religious extremists are compiling an unblemished record of being kicked out of the areas where they've taken control because their brand of Islam is so inhumane and irreligious.
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Because, in contrast, the Taliban's brand of Islam is humane and pious? I thought the reason bin Laden found such a nice home in Afghanistan and the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan was because his group and the Taliban were fellow travellers when it comes to the bat sh!t crazy wing of Sunni Islam. Now you're saying that Taliban groups could be the same as Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq? I don't see the connection.

Koabd, the Taliban of 2001 can no longer be said to exist. "Taliban" in today's media parlance is essentially just shorthand for a bewildering array of not necessarily aligned drug traffickers, tribesmen, and local militias, with they're only real connection being their Pashtun ethnicity.

Joe, I'm curious if you've been following the work of Sarah Chayes. From interviews, her view is that the single biggest issue is governance -- ordinary Afghanis would side with the central government if the central government worked for them and not against them.

I see no plausible way for the United States to make any real and lasting changes to Afghanistan. I suspect we will have some success in the near term, but unless we plan on staying there indefinately, it will inevitably return to the way it was before we invaded.

Totally OT, but did you know that Boehner Admits He Is Widely Mocked?

Joe Klein:
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Beyond the ridiculously de rigeur anonymity granted for (once again) unstated reasons, this WaPo "story" is revealingly incomplete:
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One senior government official involved in Afghanistan policy said McKiernan was overly cautious in creating U.S.-backed local militias, a tactic that Petraeus had employed when he was the top commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.
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In the WaPo reporter's apparently overwhelming desire to create the appearance of conflict with Petraeus (presumably for Drudge-style news' sake), this genius leaves out another mind-bogglingly obvious reason why it might not be such a good idea to be involved in the creation of militias in Afghanistan.

The best-known mujahideen, various loosely-aligned Afghan opposition groups, initially fought against the incumbent pro-Soviet Afghan government during the late 1970s. At the Afghan government's request, the Soviet Union became involved in the war. The mujahideen insurgency then fought against the Soviet and Afghan government troops during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. After the Soviet Union pulled out of the conflict in the late 1980s the mujahideen fought each other in the subsequent Afghan Civil War.
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The mujahideen were significantly financed and armed (and are alleged to have been trained) by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Carter[5] and Reagan administrations and the governments of Saudi Arabia, the People's Republic of China, several Western European countries, Iran, and Zia-ul-Haq's military regime in Pakistan. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was the interagent used in the majority of these activities to disguise the sources of support for the resistance. Under Reagan, U.S. support for the mujahideen evolved into an official U.S. foreign policy, known as the Reagan Doctrine, which included U.S. support for anti-Soviet resistance movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and elsewhere.[6]
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The main base station of mujahideen in Pakistan was the town Badaber, 24 km from Peshawar. Afghanistan mujahideen were trained in the Badaber base under supervision by military instructors from the U.S.A., Pakistan, and the Republic of China...
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After several years of devastating infighting, a village mullah organized a new armed movement with the backing of Pakistan. This movement became known as the Taliban, meaning "students of Islam", and referring to the Saudi-backed religious schools known for producing extremism. Veteran mujahideen were confronted by this radical splinter group in 1996.
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By 2001, the Taliban, with backing from the Pakistani ISI (military intelligence) and possibly even the regular Pakistan Army, as well as al-Qaeda which found a refuge in Afghanistan, had largely defeated the militias and controlled most of the country.

If there is anything --anything-- that we have learned about the world in the last one hundred years, isn't it that the law of unintended consequences applies with unequaled force to intervention in the affairs of the region known as "Afghanistan"?
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How is it even comprehensible that the WaPo can quote anonymous government sources stating without any apparent irony that "McKiernan's leadership was not bold or nimble enough" without a word of mention that a lack of caution with respect to funding and arming "local militias" is the reason we're fighting the Taliban in the first place?
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Is there some crazy blackout in existence amongst the establishment press corps that prevents the explicit acknowledgment of the fact that Pakistan is (and has been for decades) one side of a proxy war with us that we've now taken over fighting with our own troops?
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Is there some reason that you can think of why the WaPo's account is so miserably bereft of necessary context, Joe Klein?

Let's face it, The Man Called Petraeus was extremely lucky in Iraq. "The Awakening" combined with the effects of many months of ethnic cleansing was mostly what quieted Baghdad, along with his counterinsurgency program, - timing is everything. Perhaps he started believing his own hype.
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This is also why I absolutely despise analogizing one foreign situation or place with another. It only serves to prove that we understand practically nothing about most cultures and societies outside our own.

koabd:
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Because, in contrast, the Taliban's brand of Islam is humane and pious?
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This is a reasonable question, for sure, but Joe's right on this one.
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It's not that AQ's Islam is really more fundamentalist or anti-modernist than the Taliban's, but there is a crucial difference:
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Al Qaeda's apparent form of Islam (Qutbism) declares that everybody who aren't ruled by them are not actually Muslims

Qutbism has gained notoriety from what many believe is his strong influence on jihadi extremists such as Osama bin Laden. According to observers, jihadi extremists “cite Sayyid Qutb repeatedly and consider themselves his intellectual descendants.”[3]
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The main tenet of Qutbist ideology is that the Muslim community (or the Muslim community outside of a vanguard fighting to reestablish it) "has been extinct for a few centuries" [4] having reverted to Godless ignorance (Jahiliyya), and must be re-conquered for Islam.

When Joe mentions that "Al Qaeda-style religious extremists[']...brand of Islam is so inhumane and irreligious", he means that Taliban have more in common with "normal" Islamic fundamentalist schools like Wahhabists than with the end-of-the-lunacy-scale Qutbists:

The Taliban's extremely strict and "anti-modern" ideology has been described as an "innovative form of sharia combining Pashtun tribal codes,"[23] or Pashtunwali, with radical Deobandi interpretations of Islam favored by members of the Pakistani fundamentalist Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) organization and its splinter groups.
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Like Wahhabi and other Deobandis, the Taliban do not consider Shias to be Muslims. The Taliban also declared the Hazara ethnic group, which totaled almost 10% of Afghanistan's population, "not Muslims."[34]

So basically, while you are correct (they're all freaking hyper-religious nuts), Joe's also correct, because Al Qaeda is worse for local communities in Afghanistan than the Taliban, in as much as that, unlike the simply Shia-hating Taliban, Al Qaeda comes into an area with the premise that the residents aren't actually Muslims, and haven't been for centuries --and need conquering to make them Muslim again.
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While Taliban certainly share aggressive jihadi ideological premises with Qutbists, they are fundamentally Pushtun, and therefore completely aligned with Pushtun nationalist impulses in these communities --and aligned with their Pakistani benefactors, as well.

Round and round it goes and where it stops, nobody knows. Let's recall how we got there. The Taliban, which had been acting the fool for years after we enabled their predominance, refused to hand over binladen. We went there ostensibly to get him. The mostly nonPashtun Northern Alliance helped and has fallen by the wayside since. Bin Laden isn't mentioned much anymore. He may or may not be in them thar hills to the east in Pakistan. We scurried off to Iraq, for no good reason, but from which we now draw vital lessons to apply back in Afghanistan where we started. What a joke. Wanda Sykes says withdrawal is not a form of abstinence (referring to Sarah Palin), but I would say that in the morass we find ourselve in, that it would be a smart move.

Can anyone cite a reasonable estimate as to how many Al Qaeda agents actually exist?

@2B
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An excellent question.
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Of course it's helpful to recall that Al Qaeda in Iraq didn't exist until almost 18 months after the US invasion. It would appear that the most important requirement for membership is a willingness to take on the name.

Of course it's helpful to recall that Al Qaeda in Iraq didn't exist until almost 18 months after the US invasion.
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And it's arguable as to whether AQI can even be considered the same organization as Al Qaeda Classic. It's my understanding that aside from idealogy and tactics, the two groups are (were?) largely separate.

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